It was straight out of your favorite spy novel. The US and Israel felt threatened by Iran's totalitarian-esque government and its budding nuclear program. If this initiative wasn't stopped, there was no telling how far the growing conflict could escalate. So militaries from the two countries reportedly turned to one of the most novel weapons of the 21st century: malware. The result was Stuxnet, a powerful computer worm designed to sabotage uranium enrichment operations.
When Stuxnet was found infecting hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide, it was only a matter of time until researchers unraveled its complex code to determine its true intent. Today, analysts are up against a similar challenge. But they're finding considerably less success taking apart the Stuxnet cousin known as Gauss. A novel scheme encrypting one of its main engines has so far defied attempts to crack it, generating intrigue and raising speculation that it may deliver a warhead that's more destructive than anything the world has seen before.
Gauss generated headlines almost immediately after its discovery was documented last year by researchers from Russia-based antivirus provider Kaspersky Lab. State-of-the-art coding techniques that surreptitiously extracted sensitive data from thousands of Middle Eastern computers were worthy of a James Bond or Mission Impossible movie. Adding to the intrigue, code signatures showed Gauss was spawned from the same developers responsible for Stuxnet, the powerful computer worm reportedly unleashed by the US and Israeli governments to disrupt Iran's nuclear program. Gauss also had links to the highly advanced Flame and Duqu espionage trojans.
Gauss contains module names paying homage to the German mathematicians and scientists Johann Carl Friedrich Gauss, Kurt Friedrich Gödel, and Joseph-Louis Lagrange. Its noteworthy features only start there. Gauss has the ability to steal funds and monitor data from clients of several Lebanese banks, making it the first publicly known nation-state sponsored banking trojan. It's also programmed to collect a dizzying array of information about the computers it infects—including its network connections, processes and folders, BIOS, CMOS, RAM, and both local and removable drives.
But the most intriguing characteristic of Gauss is an encrypted payload that has so far remained undeciphered, despite the best efforts of cryptographers who have already tried millions of possible keys. Tucked deep inside the Gödel module, the secret warhead is loaded onto USB sticks and removable drives when they're connected to Gauss-infected machines. When the drives are plugged into an uninfected computer later, the mysterious code is executed—but only if it encounters the specific machine or machines targeted by the Gauss developers. On every other computer, the module remains cloaked in an impenetrable envelope that prevents researchers and would-be copycats from reverse engineering the code. The extreme stealth has stoked speculation that the payload may contain a potent exploit that could rival the Stuxnet attack that was bent on destroying uranium centrifuges inside Iran's high-security Natanz enrichment facility. Certainly not your everyday malware.
"Considering the link with Flame and Stuxnet, the payload of Gauss must be of similar magnitude," Costin Raiu, director of Kaspersky Lab's global research and analysis team, told Ars. "Given how careful the attackers were to make sure the Gauss payload doesn't fall into the 'wrong' hands, we can assume it is very special."
Built to last
Gauss is by no means the first malware with a payload that was programmed to remain dormant unless it was installed on computers meeting a narrow set of criteria. Stuxnet also contained code instructing it to destroy uranium-enrichment centrifuges only when they were physically located at Natanz. Researchers have theorized that the trigger was implemented to reduce the chances of collateral damage that might result if Stuxnet took hold in other facilities. (The precaution proved wise, since Stuxnet infected more than 100,000 computers scattered all over the globe.)
But as cryptographer Nate Lawson observed more than two years ago, the mechanism Stuxnet used to protect unintended targets from destruction was surprisingly crude for an otherwise advanced cyberweapon developed by countries with almost unlimited budgets. The coding techniques were largely limited to conditional "if/then" range checks that identified computers running German conglomerate Siemens's Simatic Step7 software inside Natanz. If an infected computer met the criteria, the sabotage payload was activated. If not, the exploit sat dormant.
Noticeably absent from Stuxnet was any kind of mechanism preventing researchers, enemies, or potential copycat programmers from peering inside the malware to see what the highly selective payload did. That's precisely what security experts such as Ralph Langner did following the Stuxnet discovery. Within a few weeks, the world had its answer: Stuxnet was a powerful cyberweapon unleashed by a well-resourced government bent on sabotaging Iran's nuclear program. While the developers may have taken care to prevent the worm from attacking other countries, they did little to conceal the true aim and methods of their malware, which attacked programmable logic controllers at the heart of the enrichment process.
"Encrypting your payload so that only the intended target can decrypt it hides both the identity of the victim and the worm's purpose," Lawson recently told Ars. "If Gauss came after Stuxnet, it's clear the authors disliked the publicity its PLC [programmable logic controller] payload received and made an effort to hide it properly the second time."
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